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ContextPerceiving one's causal control is important for adaptive behavior. Studying depression and other individual dif-
ferences has provided insight into typical as well as pathological causal processing. We set out to study factors
that have been shown to distinguish those with and without signs of depression and affect perceptions of causal
control: levels of behavior, the availability of outcomes and learning about the environment or context. Two ex-
periments were carried out in which participants, scoring low and high on the Beck Depression Inventory using
established cutoffs, completed a causal control task, in which outcomes occurred with a low (.25) or high prob-
ability (.75). Behavior levels were either constrained (N1 = 73) or unconstrained (N2 = 74). Overall, findings
showed that levels of behavior influenced people's experiences of the context in which events occurred. For all
participants, very high behavior levels eliminated sensitivity to levels of outcomes occurring in the environment
and lead to judgments that were consistent with conditional probabilities as opposed to the experimenter pro-
grammed contingency. Thus increased behavior increased perceived control via influence on context experience.
This effect was also evident for those scoring high on the BDI. Overall conclusions are that behavior and context
provide two important interlinked psychological pathways to perceived control. However, situations that
constrain people's ability to respond freely can prevent people with signs of depression from taking control of
a situation that would otherwise be uncontrollable.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).Perception of control over actions and their consequences is a hall-
mark of adaptive behavior and good mental health (Taylor & Brown,
1988). Studies have shown that people in general can discriminate
between experimentally controlled situations in which they do and do
not have control over events (Allan & Jenkins, 1983; Dickinson,
Shanks, & Evenden, 1984). In addition, comparisons between distinct
groups of people based on pre-existing individual differences, such as
levels of depression, have been used as a tool to inform our understand-
ing of the psychological processes involved in causal control for people
in general (e.g., Msetfi, Murphy, Simpson, & Kornbrot, 2005). This previ-
ous work shares the implicit assumption that the participant's causal
task is simply to learn the experimenter-presented relation and that
they may do so accurately or in a biased fashion (for a detailed back-
ground, see Allan, 1993).
However, causal information is dynamic andmuch as the uncertain-
ty principle (Heisenberg, 1927) states that themere action ofmeasuring
the velocity of quantum particles changes their velocity, human (or
animal) action has an impact on the environment in which the action
takes place; the explorer not only catalogs and measures the new
territory but by her very presence changes the subject of enquiry. In. This is an open access article underthe case of causal control, the participant can come to define both her
experience of and perception of the contingency. Thus causal control
judgments do not measure the ability to perceive a particular action-
outcome contingency, like one would measure the perception of the
weight of a held object, but rather the perception is a reflection of
both the action-outcome relation and the environmental impact of
actions over time.
Along these lines, behavioral approaches to depression (e.g.,
Lewinsohn, 1974) and studies looking at causal control in depression
(e.g., Blanco, Matute, & Vadillo, 2012) have suggested that the extent
to which people ‘do’ potentially controlling behaviors, in combination
with the relative availability of events that they might wish to control,
influences the control they experience and the relation between de-
pression and perceptions of control. For example, Alloy and Abramson
(1979) showed that people with mild symptoms of depression judged
that they had little control over frequently occurring events in contrast
to people with no signs of depression who thought that they did have
some control. In fact, the experimenters had programmed the experi-
mental task such that neither group had control and suggested that
people with depression were more realistic in their perceptions of
control. Both groups accurately judged their lack of controlwhen events
occurred infrequently suggesting that the availability of events is
important. Further, Blanco et al., (2012) showed that the ‘depressivethe CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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symptoms produce lower levels of behavior which directly predict a
low perception of control. Thus sensitivity to outcome availability and
levels of behavior would seem to be critical to a healthy assessment of
causal control. In order to further our understanding of these behavioral
dynamics of causal control, we report two experiments, which test how
levels of behavior and the availability of events influence judgments of
control in mildly depressed and non-depressed participants. First we
provide a brief background to this work.
Systematic efforts to understand the psychological processes under-
lying perceived causal control were informed byHume's (1789) key ob-
servation that cause cannot be observed directly but must be inferred
from information available in the environment, such as the temporal,
spatial and statistical relations between actions and outcomes. In partic-
ular, measuring sensitivity to causal control has involved manipulating
the statistical contingency between an action and outcome and evaluat-
ing accuracy and/or bias in judgments (Shanks & Dickinson, 1987;
Wasserman, Elek, Chatlosh, & Baker, 1993). One metric termed ΔP, or
delta P (Allan, 1980), defines the one-way contingency between actions
and outcomes as the difference between the probability of the outcome
occurring following the participant's action, p(O|A), and the probability
when no action has taken place, p(O| ~ A). When the two probabilities
are equal there is no contingency and when the difference≠ 0, then a
positive or negative contingency is present. Thus the value of ΔP can
vary from−1 through 0 to +1, like a correlation coefficient, which is
consistent with a continuum of preventative control, through no con-
trol, to complete generative control over the outcome. As illustrated in
the contingency table in Fig. 1, there are four possible action-outcome
conjunctions that are all equally relevant to this calculation (describedAction Present
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Fig. 1.Contingency tables showing four possible combinations of action-outcome information. Th
to the frequencies of action-outcome conjunctions. ΔP = A/(A + B)− C/(C + D). All examplesas cells A, B, C and D). After being exposed to a series of such conjunc-
tions, participants could be asked to rate their own causal control over
outcome occurrence using a judgment scale which maps onto the
upper and lower bounds of ΔP. Thus the determination of relative and
absolute accuracy should be straightforward.
If causal control in conceptualized in terms of this contingency
matrix, then key components of the ΔP calculation can change without
influencing overall causal control, allowing assessment of systematic
bias. For example, levels of behavior are conceptualized as the probabil-
ity of action, p(A), whereas the availability of events that people might
wish to control is measured as the probability of the outcome, p(O).
Fig. 1 demonstrates how p(A) and p(O) can vary while ΔP remains con-
stant. The four exemplar conditions shown in Fig. 1 are identical in rela-
tion toΔP, though p(A) and p(O) are varied systematically with low and
high levels of both displayed. This suggests that perceived causal control
should not vary between these conditions. To the contrary, however,
participants appear to be sensitive to these shifts, showing elevated
judgments of control with increasing p(A) and p(O) (Blanco, Matute,
& Vadillo, 2011; Msetfi et al., 2005; Murphy, Vallee-Tourangeau, Msetfi,
& Baker, 2005). These patterns of effects have been interpreted as a
systematic and non-normative bias towards illusory control.
However, considering causal control only in relation to the contin-
gency programmed by the experimenter alonemay under estimate fac-
tors influencing the experience and perception of causal control (Msetfi,
Murphy, & Kornbrot, 2012). Firstly, it is possible that the constant con-
tingency assumption is incorrect; changing p(O) or p(A) may produce
unintentional changes in the contingency that participants experience
ΔPEXP (Msetfi et al., 2012). So, as an example, increasing either p(A) or
p(O) over a fixed time frame may restrict participants' experiences toAbsent
ΔP = 0
Action Present Absent
Present
Absent
ΔP = 0
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D
e top panel shows generic information fromwhichΔP is calculated,where A, B, C andD refer
involve conditions in which ΔP = 0, yet the p(O) and the p (A) is either low or high.
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Thus, participants' judgments may be consistent with the contingency
they actually experience ΔPEXP, as opposed to the contingency pro-
grammed by the experimenter and therefore not evidence of a specific
bias in judgment. Moreover, Herrnstein's (1961) matching law, along
with evidence from contingency learning studies (Msetfi et al., 2012),
tells us that with increases in p(O), behavior levels are also likely to
increase in order to ‘match’ that level of outcomes. This suggests that
in many studies, manipulations of p(O) and variation in p(A) may be
confounded.
Second, more events will occur within the same time period than
otherwise would be the case when there are increases of p(A) and
p(O), like those displayed in Fig. 1. Changes to temporal presentation
are important (Buehner & McGregor, 2006; Shanks, Pearson, &
Dickinson, 1989). For instance, an increase in the temporal spacing
delay between action-outcome conjunctions is conceptually equivalent
increasing exposure to the context or Cell D of the contingency matrix
(Msetfi, Murphy, & Simpson, 2007; Msetfi et al., 2005). Decreasing the
temporal space has the opposite effect. This is because the temporal
space between action-outcome conjunctions is a periods of time during
which no actions and no outcomes occur. Thus, cell D, due to its
unmarked status, is particularly vulnerable to changes in the temporal
distribution of contingency events, especially in conditions in which
p(O| ~ A) is greater than 0. Thus, increases in the temporal space
would lead to ΔPEXP N experimentally programmed ΔPPROG (Msetfi
et al., 2005) whereas decreases in the temporal space would lead to
the opposite pattern,ΔPEXP b ΔPPROG. It is also important to note that in-
cluding only experimental events (spaces + cell D) into the contingen-
cy calculation could be thought of as controversial, as any periods of
time [in an individual's life] during which no actions or outcomes
occur could be potential candidates to be cell D experience (Baker,
Murphy, & Vallee-Tourangeau, 1996). It is clear, therefore, that the
value of cell D itself is ambiguous and that changes to levels of behavior
or the availability of outcomes over time, in conditions in which
p(O| ~ A) N 0 will exacerbate this ambiguity and render p(O| ~ A) un-
known and therefore ΔPEXP as well (Msetfi et al., 2012). Thus while
the information type (cell D) to be included in the equation is known,
the extent and frequency is unknown.
Importantly studies have suggested that sensitivity to such ambigu-
ity is a key area of causal control that distinguishes depressed and non-
depressed people's perceptions of causal control. This is because people
who are mildly depressed do not tend to produce judgments of control
that are sensitive to the availability of outcomes, p(O) (Alloy &
Abramson, 1979), unlike healthy people who generally judge that
they have more control when there are more outcomes available
(e.g., Dickinson et al., 1984). In addition, factors which increase the
size of such p(O) effects and increase the perception of control in the
non-depressed, including increasing the duration of the empty tempo-
ral spaces in the procedure - cell D instances - do not seem to affect
depressed participants similarly (Msetfi et al., 2007; Msetfi et al.,
2005). Furthermore, low levels of behavioral activity in depression
(Lewinsohn, Sullivan, & Grosscup, 1980), have been shown to mediate
lowperceptions of causal control (Blanco et al., 2011). Given that behav-
ior has the potential to fill empty temporal spaces with control enhanc-
ing information, i.e., action outcomepairings or cell A instances (Matute,
1996), low levels of behavior would exacerbate this problem (Blanco,
Matute, & Vadillo, 2009). Thus it seems that two potential pathways
to an increased perception of control - levels of behavior p(A) and sen-
sitivity to the availability of outcomes p(O) - are compromised in
depression. Understanding mood related differences in the pathways
to causal control will also be informative in explicating the processes
underlying healthy processing.
Thus far we have discussed how changes to p(A) or p(O) may
influence each other, change p(O| ~ A) and renderΔP unknown and am-
biguous. Though the availability of outcomes, p(O), levels of behavior
p(A), as well as exposure to the temporal space that is the environmentor context in the absence of actions or outcomes, p(~O| ~ A), all influ-
ence judgments of control, the effects of one on the other have not so
far been studied. In addition, we have described how when people are
depressed, they tend to perceive less control than healthy people, and
are less likely to produce control enhancing behavior or be sensitive to
control enhancing information. Thus far, these effects have not been
studied together only separately. Therefore the experiments reported
here were designed to explore how all three of these factors interact
by manipulating levels of p(O), observing behavioral variability
p(A) while comparingmildly depressed and non-depressed participant
groups. Thus our goalswere two-fold. First,wewanted to test the extent
towhich peoples' levels of depression predicted their levels of behavior,
and the effect of behavior on ΔPEXP and thus their perception of control.
Second, we aimed to explore dynamic changes in behavior, sensitivity
to p(O) and perceptions of casual control during the learning process.
In order to achieve these goals, it was necessary to use a contingency
judgment procedurewhich allowedus tomanipulate p(O) butwhich also
allowed observation of people's naturally occurring activity levels, p(A).
Many studies have used discrete trial designs (Alloy & Abramson, 1979;
Dickinson et al., 1984; Msetfi et al., 2005) in which participant behavior
is constrained to fixed time windows and, as such, is not self-
instigated or self-regulated. The discrete trialsmethod is often preferred
as it allows the experimenter to control and define participants' experi-
ences of contingency information (although see Msetfi et al., 2005 for
particular areas of ambiguity in this procedure). However, discrete trials
limit the extent to which the influences of temporal spacing and the
availability of outcomes can be studied in relation to naturally occurring
levels of behavioral activity. Thus for these particular studies we chose
to use a free-operant procedure in which there are no discriminable tri-
als, responses may be repeatedly performed at any time and naturally
occurring behavioral activity may be studied (see also: Wasserman,
Chatlosh, & Neunaber, 1983; Wasserman et al., 1993). There are of
course disadvantages to use of the free-operant procedure that we
will address fully in the general discussion.1. Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, we used a free-operant procedure in order to test
our hypotheses. Free-operant procedures differ from discrete trials pro-
cedures in two important respects. They allow participants to choose
both when and how frequently to respond. Therefore any differences
between our findings and previous studies showing depression and
p(O) effects might be due to differences in levels of behavior or because
participants have the opportunity to initiate and self regulate their own
behavior. Thus, it was important that, in the first experiment, we repli-
cate the depression and p(O) effects that have generally been reported
using discrete trials designs with long intervals (approximately 15-s)
in between each trial (e.g., Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Msetfi et al.,
2005). We therefore introduced a novel task instruction in order to
retain similar temporal constraints of previous work while allowing
the behavioral variability we wished to study.
In addition, at regular intervals during the procedure, participants
were asked for ratings of their own control (action rating) over the
outcome and ratings of the context's control (context rating) over the
outcome. This last measure is important as it allows us to assess partic-
ipants' sensitivity both to changes in the availability of environmental
information and their own perception of personal control against the
occurrence of events that occur randomly in the environment. All condi-
tions had a programmed ΔPPROG = 0. We predicted that participants
without signs of depression would rate their own control as higher in
high p(O) than low p(O) conditions and higher than participants
reporting signs of mild depression.We further predicted that this effect
would be driven by higher levels of behavior and a greater tendency
to discriminate between their own control and that of the context by
non-depressed participants.
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2.1. Participants
73 university students, recruited via university email lists,
volunteered to take part in this study. A priori power analysis indicated
that a sample of 70 participants was required for a power of .8 to detect
medium effects using the experimental design described below. Thus all
volunteers were tested. However, four participants were excluded from
thedata set as they did not follow the task instructions, eithermakingno
key presses at all (n= 2) or engaging in a key press ratemore than 1 SD
above themean (M=19.80 key presses/block, SD=162.67). Therefore
the final sample comprised n= 69 participants.
All participants completed the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI:
Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961) before visiting the
lab and again during their visit. On the basis of these BDI scores, non-
depressed participants were categorized as a member of the low BDI
group (scores of 8 or below, n= 38, with n= 23 females), and partici-
pants who showed signs of mild depression were categorized as the
high BDI group (scores of 9 or above, n = 31, with n = 21 females).
These cutoffs for BDI classification have been used in many previous
studies (e.g., Alloy & Abramson, 1979). Table 1 shows that these groups
were matched on a range of demographic and cognitive variables, in-
cluding age, short term memory span (Digit span test: Lezak, 1995) or
estimated IQ (Barona et al., 1984). In addition, and as expected, the
high BDI group scored significantly higher than the low BDI group
on the BDI and other measures of depression, anxiety and stress
(Depression, Anxiety, Stress Scales DASS: Lovibond & Lovibond,
1995).
2.2. Design
This study involved two design components, a quasi-experimental
design and a correlational design. In the experimental component, we
used a mixed (2 × 2 × 3) × 2 fully factorial design. The within subject
factors were control cue (action, context), p(O) (low .25, high .75),
and time block with three levels (blocks 1, 2, 3). The between subjects
variable was BDI group (low, high). In addition, the order of
p(O) exposurewas counterbalanced. Dependent variableswere the par-
ticipants' judgments of control, the number of key presses performed
and the ΔPEXP calculated by the programme on the basis of participant
behavior.
The correlational component of the study explored the extent to
which levels of depression were predictive of judgments of control
in relation to (1) the size of p(O) effects, and (2) people's degree of
perceived personal control over and above that exerted by the con-
text (see Fig. 2). The aim was to test whether this relationship was
mediated through two key outcome variables, the number of keyTable 1
Demographic and depression relevant characteristics of each group for Experiment 1.
Low BDI
(n= 38)
High BDI
(n= 31)
Independent
groups t-test*
X SE X SE t p
Age 21.34 .56 22.35 .76 1.09 .278
IQ 111.44 .80 112.55 .99 .49 .626
DS 7.87 .18 7.74 .19 .88 .388
BDI 2.74 .40 14.87 .90 13.17 b .001
DASS
(A) 2.37 .37 6.00 .70 4.79 b .001
(D) 3.18 .57 11.77 1.22 6.79 b .001
(S) 5.29 .77 12.39 1.32 4.85 b .001
Note: DS = Digit Span; BDI = Beck Depression Inventory; DASS = Depression, Anxiety
and Stress Scales; (A) = Anxiety subscale; (D) = Depression subscale; (S) = Stress
subscale. *df= 67.presses made by each participant and the resulting ΔP calculated
by the programme. Therefore, the two outcome variables were
‘p(O) effect’ (high - low p(O) action rating) and personal control
(action – context rating).
2.3. Materials
2.3.1. Free-operant contingency task
The presentation of experimental events was programmed using a
Macintosh computer and REALbasic (2009, Release 2.1) software. The
task was presented within a realistic scenario and cover story in
which participants were asked to test their own control over the occur-
rence of a 2-s music clip (outcome) by pressing the spacebar (action or
key press) on the computer keyboard. Participants were asked to leave
around 15-s between their responses. Every key press recorded at any
time would immediately generate an outcome at the scheduled proba-
bility, p(O|A). In low p(O) conditions, p(O|A) and p(O| ~ A) were always
.25, and .75 in high p(O) conditions. In addition, during the procedure,
the computer programme would check the keyboard for a key press
every 15 s. If, at that point, the key was not pressed, the programme
would record the occurrence of a ‘no press’ trial and the outcome
would occur at the scheduled probability [p(O| ~ A)]. Note that the
15 s time bin was timed to ensure similarity between p(O| ~ A) and
p(O|A) experience and the timing used with discrete trials procedures
(e.g., Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Msetfi et al., 2005).
Each p(O) condition was located within a distinct virtual context,
represented by pictures of different rooms in a house. After each 5-
minute block (3000 ms) of exposure to the context, participants were
asked to rate their own control (action rating), and that of the context
(context rating), over the outcome. There were three 5-minute time
blocks of low p(O) conditions and 3 of high p(O) conditions. The ratings
were made on the computer screen using a slider on a judgment scale,
which varied from−100 (labeled totally prevent) through 0 (labeled
no influence) to +100 (labeled totally control), with increments of
+/−1. Other dependent variables included activity levels, as measured
by the absolute number of key presses made in each 5-minute block. In
addition, we also calculated ΔPEXP as p(O|A)CALC− p(O| ~ A)CALC, where
the conditional probabilities were calculated (hence CALC) using the 15 s
time bin created by instructing participants to count 15 s between each
key press and the programming loop which checked for a key press
every 15 s. Probabilities were then calculated such that if the participant
made 20 key presses of which 15were reinforced, p(O|A)CALC= .75, and
if the programme logged 20 ‘no key press’ occasions of which 15 were
reinforced, then p(O| ~ A)CALC = .75, and ΔPEXP = 0.
2.3.2. Beck Depression Inventory (BDI: Beck et al., 1961)
The BDI is a self-report measure of depression and has been used
with clinical and student populations for many years. Participants
were asked to choose from 21 statements that best describe them.
These ranged from neutral statements (e.g., I do not feel like a failure)
scored as 0, to more extreme mood related statements (e.g., I feel I am
a complete failure as a person) scored as up to a value of 3. Total scores
could range from 0 to 63 where higher scores indicate higher levels of
depression. The BDI has been validated in student samples, correlations
of .77 being reported between BDI scores and a psychiatric rating of
severity of depression (Bumberry, Oliver, & McClure, 1978).
2.3.3. Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS: Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995)
The DASS is a 42-item self-report questionnaire that yields three
subscales, measuring the severity of depression, anxiety and stress
symptoms. Participants rate each item (e.g., I found myself getting
upset by quite trivial things) on a scale of 0 to 3, indicating the extent
to which this had applied to them in the past week. A score of 3
would indicate that the statement had applied to the participant most
of the time. There are 14 items for each of the emotional states and
each subscale can yield a maximum possible score of 42.
a1 a2 b2b1
d21
X 
Depression
M2
ΔPEXP
M1
Key 
Presses
Y     
Control
c
Fig. 2.Hypotheses for testing the relationships between depression, activity levels,ΔPEXP and control usingmediation analyses. Y1= ‘p(O) effect’=high - low p(O) rating; Y2= ‘personal
control’ = action - context rating.
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After giving written informed consent, participants provided their
demographic details, completed the digit span task and then the battery
of questionnaires. Then instructions for the contingency task were
displayed on the computer screen. The cover story required participants
to imagine that theywere in a house inwhich therewas a hidden stereo
system. Themusic could be controlled in each of the rooms of the house
(distinct contexts) using a remote control. Participants were also
informed that the remote control had been working intermittently
and that sometimes music switched on when no one was touching
the remote. Their task was to test the remote control in each of the
rooms. In addition, participants were instructed to count to 15, and
leave a minimum of 15 “elephant counts” in between subsequent key
presses. This instruction was included to retain a similar temporal
constraint to discrete trials procedures inwhich p(O) and depression ef-
fects are observed (e.g., long ITIs and constrained number of presses:
Msetfi et al., 2005). However, participants were actually able to press
the button less and more frequently than this (i.e. leave b or N 15 s in
between each key press). At the end of each 5-minute time block, a
judgment window was displayed and participants were required to
rate the causal relationship between their own action and the outcome,
and between the context and the outcome. At the end of the final time
block, participants were thanked, debriefed and received a small
financial compensation for their participation (€10).Fig. 3.Mean ratings of action (left) and context (right) control in Experiment 1 as a function of t
with filled symbols and solid lines, high BDIs with open symbols and dashed lines). Error bars3. Results and discussion
Participants rated their own control and that of the context in a free-
operant contingency learning task in low and high p(O) zero ΔP condi-
tions. Thefirst set of analyses involved looking at relative differences be-
tween conditions on control ratings and levels of activity using mixed
factorial analyses of variance, with the counterbalancing variable and
gender included. An alpha level of .05 is used throughout unless stated
otherwise.
3.1. Judgments of control
Participants rated their control higher with higher probabilities of
outcome (.75 vs .25) and high BDI scores were related to lower ratings
of control. These control judgments for each time block are shown in
Fig. 3 as a function of control cue, p(O) and BDI group. For the low BDI
group, there is clear evidence of large p(O) effects decreasing over
time block and actions were rated as more controlling than the context
in high p(O) conditions. Similar trends were evident for the high BDI
group but with greater discrimination apparent between action and
context ratings in the first time block. In addition, and as expected, in
the high p(O) condition the low BDI group gave higher action ratings
than the high BDI group.
The ANOVA revealed a significant four-way interaction between
control cue, p(O), time block and BDI group, F(2, 122) = 3.57, p =ime block (1–3), p(O) (.25 squares, .75 circles), and BDI group (with low BDIs represented
correspond to the standard error of the mean.
Fig. 4. Mean key press frequency in Experiment 1 as a function of time block (1–3),
p(O) (.25 squares, .75 circles), and BDI group (with low BDIs represented with filled
symbols and solid lines, high BDIs with open symbols and dashed lines). Error bars
correspond to the standard error of the mean.
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ing gender or the counterbalancing variable. In order to explore the 4-
way interaction, we carried out further analyses, in the first of which
we examined action and context ratings separately to provide a clear
picture of the precise location of the between groups differences. For ac-
tion ratings, there was a significant main effect of p(O), F(1, 61) =
120.47, p b .001, MSE= 1333.01, η2 = .66, qualified by a p(O) by BDI
group interaction, F(1, 61) = 4.02, p= .04, MSE = 1333.01, η2 = .06,
although the three way interaction with block was not reliable, F b 1,
p = .45. The focus of the significant 2-way interaction was that the
low BDI group gave higher action ratings than the high BDI group in
the high p(O) condition, F(1, 61) = 5.00, p = .03, MSE = 1490.39,
η2 = .08, with no significant difference in the low p(O) condition,
F b 1, p = .69. Thus the p(O) effect was larger in the low BDI group,
η2 = .72, than the high BDI group, η2 = .61.
Looking at context ratings, there was also a significantmain effect of
p(O), F(1, 61) = 24.43, p b .001, MSE = 3426.77, η2 = .29, with high
p(O) conditions rated higher than low p(O) conditions. The interaction
between p(O) and BDI group was not reliable, F b 1, p= .57, however,
the three-way interaction was significant: p(O) × BDI × block:
F(2, 122) = 3.09, p= .04?, MSE= 857.01, η2 = .10. This was because
low BDI participants' context ratings were strongly sensitive to p(O),
F(1, 34) = 18.60, p b .001, MSE = 3414.84, η2 = .35, consistently
through all the time blocks, p(O) × block: F b 1, p= .82. On the other
hand low BDI participants' context ratings did change in sensitivity to
p(O) over time block, F(2, 54) = 3.63, p = .03, MSE = 978.14, η2 =
.12. In fact, in the first time block, there was no difference between
high BDI context ratings attributable to p(O), p=.44, but this sensitivity
was evident by blocks 2 (p= .02) and 3 (p = .02). Thus whereas low
BDI group's context ratings were strongly sensitive to p(O) from the
outset, this sensitivity took time to develop in high BDI participants.
Secondly, it was important to explore the contrast between partici-
pants' ratings of their own control versus their ratings of context control
and how this differed for low and high BDI groups. This is because par-
ticipants can potentially rate their own control over the outcome as low
or high but similar and indistinguishable from the control of the context.
In some of our previous work, high BDI participants have shown little
evidence of such discrimination (Chase et al., 2011). In order to test
for this we compared action and context ratings for each level of
p(O) at each time block using single df contrasts and the alpha level ad-
justed according to the Holm procedure in order to correct for multiple
comparisons (comparisons =12). We found that for all participants it
was only block 1, high p(O) conditions, in which there was any statisti-
cal evidence of actions being rated as significantlymore controlling than
context. For low BDI participants this difference was large and reliable
at the adjusted alpha level (η2 = .26, p = .001 b αHOLM = .004).
For high BDI participants, the difference was smaller, not significant
and would only be reliable using a non-adjusted criterion (η2 = .18,
p = .02 ns N αHOLM = .005). For all other conditions there was
no evidence difference between action and context ratings, range of
p values = .16–.94.
3.2. Activity levels
As instructed, participantsmade an average of 1 key press every 15 s
during the 5-minute blocks with 19.80 (SE = 2.72) key presses in a
block and this was not significantly different from the 20 presses we ex-
pected that participants would make in the time frame, t(68) b 1, p=
.94. However, as shown in Fig. 4, while the low BDI group maintained
a low activity rate across time blocks, the high BDI group responded
more frequently early in the procedure, before settling on a similar
rate by the end of the task, BDI group × block interaction: F(1, 61) =
4.67, p= .01,MSE= 1425.95, η2 = .07. For low BDI participants, their
key press rate remained constant over time (M = 15.67 key presses
per block, SE = 1.5, p = .65) and the block effect was not reliable,
F b 1, p = .65. For high BDI participants, their key press rates weresignificantly higher than the low BDI group in block 1, F (1, 61) =
5.98, p = .02, MSE = 2420.12, η2 = .09, and their key press rates de-
creased over time blocks, F (2, 54) = 4.00, p = .02, MSE = 3112.52,
η2= .13. There was no significant p(O) × block × BDI group interaction,
F(2, 122) = 1.51, p= .22.
3.3. Mediation analysis
Two sets of mediation analyses were carried out in order to test the
hypotheses described in order to test whether levels of depressive
symptoms as measured by the BDI were predictive of activity levels
(key presses),ΔPEXP, and (Analysis 1) the size of the p(O) effect as mea-
sured by the difference between low and high p(O) action judgments
and (Analyses 2) personal control as measured by the difference be-
tween control ascribed to the action and context. These hypotheses
were described graphically in Fig. 2 and the results are shown in
Table 2, with significance examined in relation to 95% confidence limits
for the beta parameters (Analysis 1 upper, Analysis 2 lower). For analy-
sis 1, as the outcome variable constituted the difference between two
conditions, the key press and ΔPEXP measure were also the difference
between the same conditions. This showed that BDI group was the
only significant predictor of the size of the p(O) effect on action ratings,
with the effect strongest in the low BDI group, c′ = −20.04, 95% CL
[−37.13, −2.94], and this was not mediated individually or serially
by either the difference in activity levels or ΔPEXP.
Analysis 2 focused on personal control, where larger values indicate
discrimination between action and context ratings. In this analysis, as
the outcome variable was taken from one condition, key press and
ΔPEXP data from the same condition were used rather than difference
data. This analysis showed that the high BDI group produced higher
key press levels, a1 = 57.18, 95% CL [6.51, 108.24], which indirectly
predicted a greater level of discrimination between action and context
control, a1b1 = 7.58, 95% CL [.51, 24.13]. None of the other direct or
indirect effects were reliable at the 95% confidence level.
Discrimination between action and context controlwas only present
in block 1, high p(O) conditions. This effect seemed to be evident for all
participants but was only significant for the low BDI group. The media-
tion analysis then provides some explanation for this effect showing
that high BDI participants produced higher levels of key pressing
which in turn produced greater discrimination. This useful finding
Table 3
Demographic and depression relevant characteristics of each group for Experiment 2.
Low BDI
(n = 40)
High BDI
(n = 29)
Independent
groups t-test*
X SE X SE t p
Age 21.33 .56 21.59 .79 .26 .793
IQ 111.38 .72 111.70 1.04 .24 .813
DS 7.23 .23 7.06 .22 .47 .638
BDI 3.99 .41 18.14 1.61 9.78 b .001
DASS
(A) 2.75 .43 9.72 1.59 4.85 b .001
(D) 2.80 .54 14.03 1.69 7.16 b .001
(S) 6.25 .76 15.90 1.46 6.29 b .001
Note. DS = Digit Span; BDI = Beck Depression Inventory; DASS = Depression, Anxiety
and Stress Scales; (A) = Anxiety subscale; (D) = Depression subscale; (S) = Stress
subscale; *df= 67.
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least can use, high behavior levels, if available, to counter over time
the differences in outcome sensitivity evidenced here in context
ratings.
Taken together, the results of Experiment 1 were consistent with
previous research and showed that p(O) effects were stronger in low
than high BDI participants (Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Msetfi et al.,
2005), and that low BDI participants rated their own actions as more
strongly controlling in high p(O) conditions than the high BDI partici-
pants. However, therewas clear evidence that produced levels of behav-
ior contributed to greater sensitivity to the effects of behavior over
context. Low BDI participants were consistently sensitive to levels of
p(O) as demonstrated by a consistent p(O) effect on their context rat-
ings. However, this sensitivity was not present initially for the high
BDI group and, for them, developed later in the procedure. Note also
that the BDI specific p(O) findingswere not related to activity or activity
based fluctuations in ΔPEXP.
4. Experiment 2
Experiment 1was designed to include a similar constraint on behav-
ioral activity as found in discrete trials designs in order to ensure
comparability with previous research. While some variation in activity
was present, this was as expected and inline with the experimental
instructions. The next experiment was designed to remove that
constraint, and test the same hypotheses under conditions where
rates of activity are determined by the participant's own inclination.
In this experiment, the same procedure was used as in Experiment 1,
but the instruction requiring 15 counts in between key presses was
removed.
5. Method
The recruitment, design and procedure details were identical to
Experiment 1, apart from one change in the instructions; participants
were not instructed to count between key presses. Only new details
are reported here.
5.1. Participants
74 university students were recruited. Five participants were re-
moved because of atypical behavior, either making no key presses
(n = 2) or responding at an extremely high rate (N1 SD above the
mean;M= 230.18 key presses/block, SD= 407.27).
Participants were categorized as low BDI (n = 40, with n= 32 fe-
males) or high BDI (n=29, with n=24 females). Independent groups
t-tests showed that there were no between group differences in age,Table 2
Mediation analyses for Experiment 1 showing the relationships between BDI group, activity le
Direct Path β LCL UCL
Analysis 1*, where Y = p(O) effect (Χ High p(O) - Χ Low p(O)), Key Presses= (Χ High p(O)
a1 8.44 −7.67 24.56
a2 − .010 − .10 .08
b1 − .080 − .34 .18
b2 42.06 −5.55 89.66
d21 .001 − .001 .002
c′ −20.04 −37.13 −2.94
Analysis 2*, where Y = Control (Action1− Context1), Key Presses = Key Presses block 1, and
a1 57.18 6.51 108.24
a2 − .05 − .15 .05
b1 .13 − .01 .28
b2 40.45 −37.86 118.75
d21 .00 − .001 .001
c′ −20.67 −51.15 9.80
Note. *N=69; Confidence limits refer to bias corrected bootstrap 95% confidence limits. Note th
these covariates does not influence the results. Bold indicates parameter values significant at tdigit span score or estimated IQ (see Table 3). As expected, the high
BDI group produced significantly higher scores on the BDI and DASS
than the low BDI group.
6. Results
Analyses were carried as in Experiment 1.
6.1. Judgments of control
As with Experiment 1, ratings of control were higher with higher
outcomeprobability although this effectwas not present for the context
as it had been for Experiment 1. Participants' ratings of action and con-
text control are shown in Fig. 5. These ratings were analyzed using a
mixed factorial analysis of variance, including the same variables as in
Experiment 1, except for the present analysis gender was removed
due to lower numbers of males in the sample (n= 13, of which n= 5
high BDImales). Therewere no significant effects or interactions involv-
ing BDI group, all ps N .13. There was a significant two-way interaction
between cue and p(O), F (1, 64) = 24.31, p b .001, MSE = 2050.78,
η2 = .28. Further simple effects tests showed that participants gave
higher action ratings in the high than low p(O) condition, F(1, 64) =
92.12, p b .001, η2= .59. However, this effectwasmuch smaller for con-
text ratings though it did reach the significance level, F(1, 64) = 6.75,
p= .01, η2 = .10.
6.2. Activity levels
The instructions for this experiment imposed no constraint on activ-
ity. Participants had a high rate of activity, with an average of one keyvels (key presses), ΔPEXP and (1) p(O) effects, and (2) control (action− context).
Indirect path β LCL UCL
KP - Χ Low p(O) KP), and ΔPEXP = (Χ High p(O) ΔPEXP - Χ Low p(O) ΔPEXP).
a1b1 − .67 −6.05 1.31
a1d21b2 .29 − .22 2.34
a2b2 − .41 −6.43 3.40
ΔPEXP = ΔPEXP block 1. Order of presentation is a covariate.
a1b1 7.58 .51 24.13
a1d21b2 .03 − .50 1.00
a2b2 −1.93 −12.80 1.58
at in both analyses, Gender and anxiety are included as covariates though the inclusion of
he 95% confidence level.
Fig. 5.Mean ratings of action (left) and context (right) control in Experiment 2 as a function of time block (1–3), p(O) (.25 squares, .75 circles), and BDI group (with low BDIs represented
with filled symbols and solid lines, high BDIs with open symbols and dashed lines). Error bars correspond to the standard error of the mean.
8 N.C. Byrom et al. / Acta Psychologica 157 (2015) 1–12press every 1.89 seconds, that is 158.64 (SE= 18.23) key presses in a
block. These data are shown in Fig. 6 and suggest that key press behavior
in the lowBDI groupwas strongly responsive to levels of p(O), higher key
press rates in the low p(O) conditions. However, high BDI participants did
not show the same pattern. The result of the mixed ANOVA supported
this observation, as there was a significant interaction between BDI
group and p(O), F(1, 65) = 5.05, p= .028, MSE= 38825.01, η2 = .07.
The simple effects tests showed that the low BDI group increased their
key press levels significantly in low p(O) conditions, F(1, 65) = 14.63,
p b .001, η2 = .18. Key pressing in the high BDI group remained static
was not sensitive to p(O), F b 1, p= .80.
6.3. Mediation analysis
Two sets of mediation analyses were carried out as described in
Experiment 1 (see Table 4). The first analysis showed that there
was no direct relationship between BDI group and the size of theFig. 6. Mean key press frequency in Experiment 2 as a function of time block (1–3),
p(O) (.25 squares, .75 circles), and BDI group (with low BDIs represented with filled sym-
bols and solid lines, high BDIswith open symbols and dashed lines). Error bars correspond
to the standard error of the mean.p(O) effect, c' =−2.04, 95% CL [−23.62, 19.53], but that the difference
in key press activity between the two p(O) conditions mediated the re-
lationship between BDI group and the p(O) effect, a1b1 = 9.74, 95% CL
[2.72, 21.14]. In order to interpret this effect, recall that the mediator
variable here is the difference between key presses in the high and
low p(O) conditions. For the low BDI group, this difference was large
and negative (see Fig. 5), because they key pressed most in low
p(O) conditions, whereas for the high BDI group the difference was
closer to zero and positive. Thus the mediation analysis shows that
difference in the size of the p(O) effect is attributable to the BDI group's
influence on behavioral sensitivity to p(O), which then influences the
size of p(O) effects on ratings. For the high BDI group, low behavioral
sensitivity produced a 9.74 point rating increase in the size of
p(O) effect (see also Fig. 4).
Mediation analysis 2 showed that there were no reliable relation-
ships, direct or indirect, between BDI group and personal control.
Taken together, the results derived from the free-operant procedure
with no activity constraint yielded very different findings to the previ-
ous experiment. Participants' action ratings were highly sensitive to
p(O) but their context ratings were not. Mediation analysis revealed
how BDI group influenced the size of p(O) effects through behavioral
sensitivity to p(O) in a manner not captured by standard ANOVA com-
parisons. Specifically, the high BDI group showed no behavioral sensi-
tivity to p(O), maintaining high key pressing rates throughout and
producing almost a 10-point larger p(O) effect on action ratings. On
the other hand, the low BDI group increased their levels of behavior
when there were fewer outcomes available, which counter-intuitively
reduced the size of the p(O) effect.
It is also important to note one key area of similarity in the findings
of the two experiments, while also bearing inmind an important caveat.
In both experiments ΔPEXP was not predictive of ratings, either directly,
or indirectly, as a step on a pathway that starts withmood effects on be-
havior. This is contrary to our hypothesis which suggested that changes
in levels of behavior would modify the number of occurrences of cell A
events, and importantly impact on the availability of a key source of am-
biguity, cell D events and p(O| ~ A) thus influencing the experienced
contingency and judgments of control. These finding are similar to
Blanco et al. (2011) who also found that the experienced contingency
they calculated using a discrete trials procedure was not predictive of
ratings in spite of there being significant variability between the experi-
enced and programmed contingencies. In their study, as in this one,
behavior was a key predictor of ratings.
Table 4
Mediation analyses for Experiment 2 showing the relationships between BDI group, activity levels (key presses), ΔPEXP and (1) p(O) effects, and (2) control (action− context).
Direct Path β LCL UCL Indirect path β LCL UCL
Analysis 1*, where Y = p(O) effect (Χ High p(O) − Χ Low p(O)), Key Presses= (Χ High p(O) KP− Χ Low p(O) KP), and ΔPEXP = (Χ High p(O) ΔPEXP− Χ Low p(O) ΔPEXP).
a1 118.98 28.27 209.68 a1b1 9.74 2.72 21.14
a2 0.06 − .001 .001 a1d21b2 − .02 −2.04 1.07
b1 .082 .03 .14 a2b2 − .46 −7.01 2.62
b2 −8.24 −65.85 49.37
d21 .001 − .001 .002
c′ −2.04 −23.62 19.53
Analysis 2*, where Y = Control (Action1− Context1), Key Presses = Key Presses block 1, and ΔPEXP = ΔPEXP block 1. Order of presentation is a covariate.
a1 −82.42 −196.30 31.46 a1b1 −5.21 −13.65 1.19
a2 − .01 − .09 .07 a1d21b2 .03 −1.84 1.60
b1 .06 .001 .13 a2b2 .01 −3.37 3.17
b2 −1.32 −89.11 86.46
d21 .001 .001 .003
c′ −5.46 −32.84 21.75
Note. *N=69; Confidence limits refer to bias corrected bootstrap 95% confidence limits. Note that in both analyses, Gender and anxiety are included as covariates though the inclusion of
these covariates does not influence the results.
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which cell C and D events should be counted, and thus p(O| ~ A) calcu-
lated, which is not clear when free-operant procedures are used. In Ex-
periment 1, we matched the cell count time frame to the behavioral
constraint introduced by the instructions (i.e. every 15-s the pro-
gramme checked for a cell C or D event). This programming strategy
was maintained in Experiment 2 for equivalence across experiments.
However, the behavioral time frame was very different with a key
press recorded every 2-s on average. This means that, in Experiment
2, the cell C/D time frame was out of kilter with behavior and ΔPEXP
may have been inaccurate. This raises a very important point around
the appropriate time frame of p(O| ~ A) experience and we will return
to this later in the general discussion.
7. General discussion
The findings of two experiments on judgments of causal control
made after exposure to a free-operant contingency procedure showed
that behavior and context are critical aspects of people's experiences
and perceptions of causal control which are affected by the symptoms
of depression. Although both can be manipulated by an experimenter
(Matute, 1996; Msetfi et al., 2005), these findings show that both can
also be influenced by the participant themselves thereby increasing
their sense of agency with potential implications for alleviating feelings
of helplessness in depression. Specifically,within the constrained proce-
dure, which preserves temporal spacing as in previous studies, low BDI
participants were more sensitive than high BDI participants to levels of
outcomes available, both in relation to action and context ratings. High
BDI participants were sensitive to p(O), but less so than others. For con-
text ratings, which are a measure of sensitivity to outcomes available in
the environment, p(O) sensitivity took longer to develop in the high BDI
group and thiswas concurrentwith their high levels of behavioral activ-
ity. This points towards activity levels, and the ability to withhold activ-
ity, as being crucial in allowing people to develop outcome rate
sensitivity and personal control as demonstrated by behaviorally medi-
ated BDI effects on perceived control. When the behavioral constraint
was removed, activity levels increased dramatically and consequently
temporal spacingwas reduced. Asmight have been predicted, all partic-
ipants' action ratings were sensitive to p(O) but their context ratings
were not, presumably because they had almost no experience of the
outcome rate in the absence of activity. However, low BDI participants'
behaviorwas highly sensitive to outcome levels, withmuchhigher rates
of behavior evident in low p(O) conditions when fewer outcomes were
available. Counter intuitively, the high BDI group pressed consistently
across all conditions, and this increased the size of the p(O) effect on
their action ratings. This again demonstrates that when the ambiguity
of p(O| ~ A) experience is removed from the equation, here because ofbehavioral increase, perceived and experienced causal control is en-
hanced. Thus, a key outcome of this study is the finding that, together,
behavior and context provide two linked pathways to perceived causal
control, and that by creating fixed immutable experimental procedures
we are ignoring important aspects of behavior that humans use in order
to assert, determine or respond to causal control. Although we discuss
these separately below, the interactivity between context and behavior
must be emphasized.
7.1. Behavioral pathway to causal control
In these experiments, we observed shifts in behavioral activity,
though not exactly as expected. We certainly expected that people
would produce high rates of behavior in these naturalistic free-
operant conditions (Matute, 1996) and this is what we found. However,
we also expected that those scoring higher on the BDI would show less
activity than others and that this tendency would be linked to a smaller
p(O) effect (Blanco et al., 2012). In fact, we found no evidence of a gen-
eral trend towards lower levels of behavior in high BDI participants.
When constraints were imposed on behavior, at least initially, high
BDI participants engaged in twice as much key pressing as low BDI
participants, before their activities normalized to the same level as
others. This effect was concurrent with reduced p(O) sensitivity on
context ratings and a between (BDI) group difference on action ratings.
This mood difference in action control ratings has been observed on
many occasions (Blanco et al., 2012; Msetfi et al., 2005), and has been
explained via low levels of behavior in depression or an inability to pro-
cess context information. The findings of the current study suggest that
higher behavior levels reduce ability to be sensitive to outcome rates in
the environment, with a knock on effect on perceived action control.
We had also anticipated that that higher levels of activity would be
evident in high p(O) conditions where activity is reinforced on the
majority of trials, increasing motivation to respond on the next trial
(Matute, 1996). When, activity was unconstrained by the task instruc-
tions, we did observe a p(O) effect on behavior, but it was low
p(O) conditions that produced the highest levels of behavior in low
BDI participants, with no difference present for high BDI participants.
Not only is this finding inconsistent with assumptions made about the
relation between key pressing and reinforcement (Matute, 1996), it is
also inconsistent with Herrnstein's (1961) matching law which states
that behavior tends to ‘match’ the reinforcement contingencies. In the
unconstrained procedure reported here, behavior was more consistent
with a ‘maximization’ strategy (Msetfi et al., 2012) in which behavior
increased in spite of a low outcome probability in order to maximize
the absolute levels of outcomes received.
However, considering the contrasting findings of the two experi-
ments, an important observation emerges. When participants were
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chose, activity levels increased dramatically. This increase was impor-
tant to causal control in two ways. First, it resulted in no sensitivity to
outcome rates in the environment as relevant experience was limited.
Second, ambiguity was removed from the control situation as the par-
ticipant gained almost no experience of not responding and noting
whether or not the outcome occurred. In other words, cell C and D
occurrences were almost eliminated from the contingency meaning
that ΔP= p(O|A). We will return to this issue later, however an impor-
tant point, not addressed by our data, is whether or not behavior was
used strategically to create these effects or whether it was a reflex
response to environmental contingencies.
7.2. Contextual pathway to causal control
Theoretical approaches to contingency learning involving the devel-
opment of associations have proposed context as a key moderator var-
iable in learning about causal control. There are different mechanisms
proposed for how context exerts its influence. For example, the
Rescorla-Wagner model (RWM: Rescorla & Wagner, 1972), when
applied to contingency learning, describes perceived control as being
dependent on the strength of action-outcome associations, though all
stimuli present in a learning situation including the context will also
acquire associative strength (Dickinson et al., 1984). RWM assumes
that outcomes can only support a limited amount of associative strength
and thus actions and context compete for associationwith the outcome.
This notion of associative competition means that an action will gain
associative strength to the extent that the context (or indeed other
relevant stimuli) does not have it, and vice versa. The Comparator Hy-
pothesis (Miller & Matzel, 1988) proposes an alternative mechanism
to explain the influence of context (amongst other effects). According
to this view both context and action gain associative strength indepen-
dently but the response depends on the comparison between the two,
rather than the absolute strength of the individual associations. Our
findings do not explicitly distinguish between these two approaches.
However, whichever approach is taken, the implications are that if
that the process of context-outcome association acquisition or extinc-
tion is impaired, compromised or affected in anyway, there will be a
knock on effect on perceived control. Thus these findings are consistent
with the idea that context is a key moderator of learning about causal
control and mood differences provide insight into the mechanisms
involved.
Along these lines, our previous work also suggested that context
may be the key feature of contingency learning which distinguishes
those who score low and high on the BDI (Msetfi, Wade, & Murphy,
2013). Manipulations of periods of context exposure with zero contin-
gencies had no effect on high BDI groups' judgments of low and
high p(O) conditions of which there was no difference, whereas low
BDIs were affected such that p(O) effects were only strongly evident
with long periods of contextual exposure (Msetfi et al., 2005). Our inter-
pretation of this was that contextual exposure acts as an instance of
cell D in the contingency matrix, or a non-reinforced context only
trial, allowing low BDIs to extinguish context associations and thus
strengthen action associations, with high BDIs impervious to this
manipulation. The findings of Experiment 1 here, in which the long
temporal space was preserved, were consistent with those previous
findings made using discrete trials procedures. Low BDI participants
evidenced stronger p(O) effects on their action ratings than high BDI
participants. However, in this experiment, in which we took explicit
ratings of context, we saw no evidence in low BDI participants of
weak context ratings caused by the long cell D spaces. In fact, context
ratings were relatively high for these participants. Moreover, higher
levels of depressed mood predicted higher levels of key presses, which
then produced a larger difference between action and context ratings.
If this last metric, levels of discrimination between action and context,
represents a more accurate measure of perceived control than actionor context ratings individually, this might imply that irrespective of
the absolute level of ratings, those who were mildly depressed experi-
enced an enhanced sense of control. Furthermore, as specified by the
Comparator Hypothesis (Miller & Matzel, 1988), action and context
associations may develop independently, and the contrast between
them at the time of judgment may determine perceived control, as
opposed to the strength of the action association.
7.3. Temporal constraints and ambiguous information
We have discussed thus far how these data suggest that behavior
and context influence each other to provide two linked pathways to
causal control. However, the contrast in the data collected between
these two experiments demonstrates the importance of the temporal
and behavioral constraint present in the control scenario. This could
be an instructionalmanipulation in a lab task like this one, or it could in-
volve real world constraints that limit or induce activity thus influenc-
ing the extent to which the context is exposed. It is clear in these data
that patterns of control ratings, which are thought of as characteristic
of depression, are evident in constrained situations and that removal
of the constraint provided a behaviorally mediated shift in ratings.
This suggests that circumstances, which constrain people's natural ten-
dencies to respond to the contingencies around them, could constitute a
block in an important pathway to causal control.
In fact, when constraints were removed in our study, high levels
of behavior eliminated the all-important ambiguity inherent in con-
textual information. In our introduction we stated that this ambigu-
ity is because cell D experience, which is composed of instances of no
actions and no outcomes, could reside in extra-trial as well as intra-
trial experience (Msetfi et al., 2005) but could also potentially in-
clude other experiences from an individual's life (Baker et al.,
1996). While the experimental context serves as an important mark-
er for a focal set of relevant events (Cheng & Novick, 1990) and it
seems likely that only those in the experiment are processed as rele-
vant to causal control, a further area of ambiguity and complexity re-
mains. It is not clear whether one period of contextual exposure,
marked for example at the beginning and end by an occurrence of a
cell A or cell B event, would count as one cell D event or many
(Msetfi et al., 2005), or whether the duration of the exposure could
be segmented into multiple cell D experiences. In other words the
temporal frame, over which cell D accumulates, or indeed context
associations develop, is unclear. Similarly, for experimenters pro-
gramming no action, cell C and D experience within a free-operant
procedure, the temporal frame chosen is arbitrary and may not be
consistent with temporal frame used in everyday information process-
ing. Indeed, if a temporalwindowwere adopted thatwould allow ongo-
ing experience to be ‘parsed’ into individual events, its size could be
dynamic and based on pre-existing knowledge about the situation or
many other factors (Buehner, 2005; Greville & Buehner, 2010). Howev-
er, while in our study participants were able to remove this ambiguity
from the causal control problem via their behavior, temporal dynamics
and event parsing remain another important known-unknown of
causal control learning.
7.4. Implications for depression
The implications of these findings for our understanding of depres-
sion cannot be discussed without first acknowledging the limitations
of this work. First of all, participants were not patients diagnosed by a
clinician as experiencing depression. They were university students
scoring above or below the cut-off for mild depression on the Beck
Depression Inventory. Although such cutoffs have been validated on
psychiatric (Beck et al., 1961) as well as student samples (Bumberry
et al., 1978), any implications for more severe levels of depression
must be treated with caution. Secondly, data and findings were clearly
derived from laboratory tasks, which, although constructed for this
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and thus generalizability to the real world could be questioned (Haaga
& Beck, 1995). Moreover, given the uncertainty that we have identified,
both here and elsewhere (Msetfi et al., 2005), as to the true contingency
relation that participants experienced and even the correct measure of
control, it would be foolhardy to relate findings to judgment bias or ac-
curacy in either group of participants.Whilst acknowledging all of these
limitations, however, there are implications of these findings for mild
depression which are not predicated on assumptions of a known
experienced contingency.
In this study, all participants engaged in relatively high levels of
behavior with no evidence of a general trend towards behavioral
passivity amongst those who were mildly depressed. However, al-
though those with signs of mild depression were certainly capable
of high behavior levels, these did not shift, whether strategically or
automatically, as a function of outcome availability. This suggests
that any behavioral impairment associated with depression is not
an absolute but may be specifically related to outcome sensitivity
and the extent to which reinforcing outcomes drive behavior. Irre-
spective of this, mildly depressed participants benefited from
high levels of behavior in unconstrained conditions, eliminating
the moderating role of context and producing action control
judgments that were high and similar to those with low BDI scores.
This is important given that many successful therapeutic
approaches to depression include a behavioral activation compo-
nent (including various types of cognitive therapy), which involves
increasing levels of activity and opportunities for positive rein-
forcement (see Dimidjian, Barrera, Martell, Muñoz, & Lewinsohn,
2011 for a detailed discussion), but may not adequately recognize
the relation between behavior and context as interlinked pathways
to control.8. Conclusion
In this paper, we set out to study the roles of levels of behavior and
the availability of outcomes in the environment, and their interactive
effects, on causal control learning in people who scored low and high
on a depression scale. Initially, we had identified the moderating effect
of context as a key area of ambiguity in control learning, which seems
to separate people with and without signs of depression. This was the
case in the present study. Key findings are that behavior, via its effect
on exposure to the context, provided a powerful pathway to resolve
this particular ambiguity, though others remain in relation to the tem-
poral parsing of events. Temporal and behavioral constraints on control
learning, as a product of the situation or an individual difference, such as
depression, may act as a block to people's ability to enhance their sense
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